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Abstract
The paper relaxes the one unit storage capacity imposed in the basic search-theoretic
model of at money with indivisible real commodities and indivisible money. Agents
can accumulate as much money as they want. It characterizes the stationary distri-
butions of money and shows that for reasonable parameter values (e.g. production
cost, discounting, degree of specialization) a monetary equilibrium exists. There are
multiple stationary distributions of a given amount of money, which di¤er in their
levels of economic activity and welfare. The model reveals two essential features of
money. First, the marginal expected utility of money decreases. Second, there exists
an endogenous upper bound on the money holdings: agents willingly produce and
sell for money up to this bound and refuse to do so if their money holdings exceed
this bound.
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1 Introduction
The paper extends the basic search-theoretic model of at money with indivisible money
and indivisible real commodities by considering a model in which agents can accumulate
as much money as they want. There are two reasons for doing so. First, in the basic model
developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), agents have a one unit storage capacity,
which does not allow them to hold more than one unit of money. Although this limitation
seems to be unrealistic, the basic model is very useful to illustrate certain essential features
of money and certain aspects of the exchange process without having to determine the
distribution of money holdings. By removing this limitation, however, additional properties
of money can be derived. It is shown that the marginal value of money decreases; the more
money an agent owns, the smaller is the additional insuranceagainst a lack of cash that
additional money provides. Moreover, there exists an endogenous upper bound on the
money holdings. Agents with money holdings below this bound willingly produce and sell
for money while agents with money holdings above this bound cease production and selling.
Second, relaxing the one unit storage technology allows one to study distributional issues.
Without this constraint, there are multiple stationary distributions of a given quantity
of money that di¤er in their levels of economic activity and welfare and, consequently, a
redistribution of money a¤ects real economic variables.
Following the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991,1993), search models of at
money have undergone rapid development. A number of papers incorporated bilateral
bargaining into their models to derive relative prices endogenously. Articles by Berentsen,
Molico, and Wright (1998), Trejos and Wright (1995), and Shi (1995) are the main exam-
ples. Other articles have addressed the limitation on the distribution of money imposed
by restricting the inventories of individual agents. Two types of related research have been
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undertaken to remove these restrictions. On the one hand, Molico (1998) and Molico and
Musalem (1996) remove simultaneously all restrictions on the accumulation of goods and
money. Their models have all the desirable featuresbut they are di¢ cult to analyze ana-
lytically. The authors, therefore, use numerical methods to derive the bargaining solutions
and to characterize the stationary distributions of goods and money.
On the other hand, other authors have studied less modied versions of the basic model.
Articles by Corbae and Camera (1997), Green and Zhou (1998a), Li (1994), Shi (1997),
and Zhou (1998) are the main examples. Shi considers a model with divisible money and
divisible commodities in which the traders bargain bilaterally about how much to trade.
Each household consists of many members who pool their money holdings each period,
which eliminates aggregate uncertainty for households because the distribution of money
is degenerate across households. In the symmetric equilibrium all households hold the same
amount of money and, consequently, all commodities are exchanged at the same price.
Zhou and Green and Zhou investigate a model where agents can hold any arbitrary
amount of divisible money and bargain bilaterally about the amount of money that is
exchanged for one unit of an indivisible commodity. Their focus is on the existence of
a monetary equilibrium when all commodities are traded at the same price. In Green
and Zhous model the agents obtain their production good at no cost. In Zhous model
production is costly, which gives rise to an endogenous bound on money holdings. In both
models, money holdings are private information and when a buyer meets a seller, the seller
makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er to the buyer (seller-posting-price protocol). Green and
Zhou and Zhou conjecture a pattern of exchange in which all trades take place at one price
and then provide conditions under which such an equilibrium exists.
Corbae and Camera study a model with indivisible money where agents can accumulate
3
money up to an exogenous bound. When a buyer and a seller meet, the buyer makes a
take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er about the quantity of the divisible consumption commodity to be
exchanged for one unit of money. When the buyers make their o¤ers they know the money
holdings of the sellers. Similar to the articles of Green and Zhou and Zhou, Corbae and
Camera conjecture a uniform pattern of exchange, and then provide conditions under which
such an equilibrium exists.
Li studies the accumulation of commodity inventories in search equilibrium. In his
model no agent can accumulate money and money and real commodities must be exchanged
one for one. He nds that search e¤orts and inventory accumulation are too low relative
to the social optimum and shows that an ination tax can improve aggregate welfare.
In the rst part of the paper the equilibrium behavior of the agents and the station-
ary distributions of money holdings are derived. Then, it is shown that for reasonable
parameter values (e.g. production cost, discounting, degree of specialization) a monetary
equilibrium exists. Finally, the existence of multiple stationary distributions of a given
quantity of money is discussed.
2 The model
The economy consists of J > 2 distinct nonstorable commodities. The commodities are
indivisible and come in units of size one. They are produced and consumed by a large
number of innitely lived agents who di¤er in their tastes for and in their ability to produce
these commodities. Each agent has one favorite commodity, which is called his consumption
good. Consuming one unit yields utility U > 0. Consuming one of the other commodities
yields zero utility. No agent can produce his own consumption commodity; nevertheless,
each agent has the ability to produce one of the other J commodities at cost C, U > C > 0.
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Particularly, an agent of type s produces commodity s and consumes commodity s + 1
(modJ). Accordingly, the number of types is J .1 In addition to the consumption goods,
there is also an object called at money. Fiat money comes in indivisible units of size one,
is storable, and cannot be consumed by any agent. Agents can accumulate and hold as
much money as they want.
All agents have to trade to get their consumption good. For this purpose they search
for trading partners. Time is discrete and in each period each agent meets one other
agent. The order of events in a match is as follows: 1) the traders decide whether to trade
and what to trade; 2) the production takes place and the objects change hand; 3) the
traders separate and the traded commodities are consumed; 4) when the agents trade real
commodities for money they always exchange one unit of a real commodity for one unit of
money.2
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with mass 1, the measure of agents
of each type is equal, and all agents in each period are randomly matched into pairs with
equal probability. This symmetry implies that the agents meet other agents of a particular
type with equal probability q = J 1. Thus, q is the probability of meeting a producer of
ones consumption commodity and of meeting an agent eager to get ones product. Denote
by mi (t) the measure of agents with money holdings i, at time t. In the steady state
equilibrium, mi (t) = mi. Denote further by m a set of measures mi, i = 0; ::;1, satisfyingP1
i=0mi = 1, by pb the probability that an agent can buy his consumption commodity,
and by ps the probability that he can sell his product before he is matched. He can buy his
consumption commodity if his partner can produce this good and if the partner is willing
to do so for money. He can sell for money if his trading partner is a consumer of his
production commodity and has money. Denote the expected utility (value function) of an
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agent with money holdings i by V i. Then, if  is the discount factor, the value functions
satisfy
V 0 = ps max

V 1   C; V 0	+ (1  ps) V 0 (1)
V i = pb max

U + V i 1; V i
	
+ ps max

V i+1   C; V i	+ (1  ps   pb) V i, i > 0.
For example, with probability ps an agent with no money meets an individual willing
to buy his product. The agent proposes (accepts) to sell his product if V 1 C  V 0 and
refuses to do so if V 1   C < V 0. With probability (1  ps) no trade takes place.
Denition 1 A monetary equilibrium is a list hV;mi such that:
i) V satises (1) taking m as given,
ii) m is stationary taking V as given, and
iii) V > 0.
According to the rst part of Denition 1, the monetary equilibrium is a Nash equi-
librium for a given set of measures m. The second part requires that the economy is in a
steady state given the selling and buying activities induced by (1). The third part requires
that money has value.3
Lemma 1 In a monetary equilibrium the value functions satisfy4
a) 0  V i < pbU
1  , i  0,
b) V i > V i 1, i  1,
c) U + V i 1 > V i, i  1
d) V i   V i 1 > V i+1   V i, i  1.
According to a), in a monetary equilibrium the expected lifetime utility is never smaller
than the expected utility in the nonmonetary equilibrium and it is strictly smaller than
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Figure 1: Decreasing marginal value of money.
the expected utility of an agent who has money without bounds. According to b), he
expected utility of an agent increases with his money holdings. c) implies that an agent is
always willing to buy his consumption commodity and d) that the marginal value of money
decreases. The decreasing marginal value of money is due to the fact that the more money
an agent owns, the longer is the expected length of time between the date he acquires
additional money and the date he spends it. When agents discount future utilities the
increasing expected length of time results in a decreasing marginal value of money.
Proposition 1 In a monetary equilibrium there exists a bound n such that V i+1   C <
V i, i  n, and V i+1   C  V i, i < n.
Proof: Denote by V the expected utility of an agent that never reaches state i = 0,
and note that limi!1 V i = V , limi!1 V i+1 = V , and limi!1 (V i+1   V i) = 0. According
to Lemma 1, V i   V i 1 > V i+1   V i, i  1. This implies that there exists a n such that
V i+1   C < V i, i  n, and V i+1   C  V i, n > i  0.
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In a monetary equilibrium agents are willing to produce and sell for money if i < n
and refuse to do so if i  n. This behavior is summarized in Figure 2 where the horizontal
axis displays the money holdings i and the vertical axis the marginal value of money
MV = (V i+1   V i). Note also that Proposition 1 determines the probabilities of selling
and buying. They are ps = q (1 m0) and pb = q (1 mn), respectively.
Corollary 1 In a monetary equilibrium, the measures m satisfy
mi = m
(n in )
0 m
( in)
n > 0, i = 0; :::; n, and mi = 0, i > n. (2)
nX
i=0
m
(n in )
0 m
( in)
n = 1. (3)
If m0 S mn; then mi S mi+1; i = 0; :::; n  1: (4)
Proof: Consider, rst, the second part of (2). Assume that, to the contrary of Corollary
1, mi > 0 for some i > n. According to Proposition 1, agents with money holdings i > n
do not produce and sell. However, they are willing to spend money. Hence, mi > 0, i > n,
is not stationary. Consider, next, the rst part of (2). In a steady state, the measure of
agents who leave state i equals the measure of agents that enter this state. All steady state
conditions are summarized in the following n+ 1 equations:
n : pbmn = psmn 1
n  1 : (pb + ps)mn 1 = pbmn + psmn 2
 : 
n  i : (pb + ps)mn i = pbmn i+1 + psmn i 1
 : 
1 : (pb + ps)m1 = pbm2 + psm0
0 : psm0 = pbm1
(5)
One of the equations is redundant and the remaining equations simplify to
pbmi = psmi 1, i = 1; ::; n, and (6)
mi =
m2i 1
mi 2
, i = 2; ::; n (7)
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Solving (7) recursively yields the rst part of (2). Combine (2) with
Pn
i=0mi = 1 to get
(3). To see that (4) holds, divide mi by mi+1 to get m0mn =

mi
mi+1
n
. To see that mi > 0,
i = 0; :::; n, assume to the contrary that for some i  n, mi = 0. Then by (2), either
m0 = 0 or mn = 0. If m0 = 0, mi = 0, i = 0; :::; n  1, and mn = 1, which implies that no
agent is willing to sell for money and V i = 0 for all i contradicting Denition 1. If mn = 0,
mi = 0, i = 1; :::; n, and m0 = 1, which implies that no agent has money and V i = 0 for
all i contradicting Denition 1. 
3 Existence
For any set of measures m a monetary equilibrium exists if m satises (2) and (3) and if
no agent has an incentive to either increase his money holdings above n or to refuse to sell
for money when i < n. Thus, a stationary distribution is a xed point of the mapping
f : D ! D where D contains all m. Because (2) and (3) are necessary conditions it is
su¢ cient to study the set D1 = fm : m satises (2) and (3)g and the mapping f : D1 !
D1. To proceed denote by C the value of C that solves C
 1 = V n (m) V n 1 (m) and by
~C the value of C that solves C 1 = V n+1 (m)  V n (m).
Proposition 2 For any m 2 D1 there exist critical values C and ~C constructed in the
proof, with C > ~C > 0, such that the following is true: if C  C > ~C, m is stationary,
and if C > C or if ~C  C, m is not stationary.
Proof: By construction of C and ~C, if C  C > ~C, agents with money holdings n 1 are
willing to produce for money whereas agents with money holdings n are not willing to do so.
Then, the concavity property d) of Lemma 1 implies that all agents with money holdings
i < n are willing to produce for money and all agents with money holdings i  n are not
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willing to do so. Finally, m satises (2) and (3). This establishes that m is stationary if
C  C > ~C. If C > C, agents with money holding n   1 are not willing to produce for
money and if ~C  C, they increase their money holdings above n and m is not stationary.
To derive C and ~C, rewrite (1) to get
V 0 = ps
 
V 1   C+ (1  ps) V 0
V i = pb
 
U + V i 1

+ ps
 
V i+1   C+ (1  pb   ps) V i; i = 0; :::; n  1 (8)
V n = pb
 
U + V n 1

+ (1  pb) V n:
(8) denes a second-order linear nonhomogeneous di¤erence equation with constant coe¢ -
cients and constant term and two initial conditions. The second equation is the di¤erence
equation and the rst and the third equations are the two initial conditions. The solution
is
V i = 1
i
1 + 2
i
2 + ; i = 1; ::; n: (9)
where 0 < 1 < 1 and 2 > 1 are the two distinct real roots
i =
1   (1  pb   ps)
q
(1   (1  pb   ps))2   42pbps
2ps
, i = 1; 2: (10)
1 =
(1 2)(pbn2U ps1C)
(1 )(n+12  n+11 )
and 2 =
(1 1)(ps2C pbn1U)
(1 )(n+12  n+11 )
are the coe¢ cients, and  = pbU psC
1 
is the particular integral. Use (9) to get5
C =
n1
n
2 (2   1)U 
n+12   n+11
  (n2   n1 ) (11)
To derive ~C use V n+1 = pb (U + V n) + (1  pb) V n+1 and (8) to get
V n+1   V n =

pb
1   + pb
 
V n   V n 1 . (12)
Then, use (12) and (9) to get
~C =
n1
n
2 (2   1) pbU
(1   + pb)
 
n+12   n+11
  pb (n2   n1 ) > 0 (13)
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(12) implies that C > ~C. To see that ~C > 0, note that the numerator and the denominator
of (13) are positive because n+12   n+11 > n2   n1 > 0.
Proposition 3 For any bound n, a monetary equilibrium exists if
C < U

q
1   + q
n
. (14)
Proof: First, note that for any m 2 D1 the quantity of money is M =
Pn
i=0 imi where
M 2 [0; n]. Then, dene the sets D2 = fhM;ni : M 2 (0; n); n 2 f1; :::;1gg and D3 =
fhm0; ni : m0 2 (0; 1) ; n 2 f1; :::;1gg and note that there exists a one-to-one correspon-
dence between D1, D2, and D3. To see this note, rst, that - given n - (3) denes a strictly
decreasing functionmn = mn (m0; n) and, therefore,m = fm0; :;mi (m0; n) ; :;mn (m0; n) ; 0; ::g,
which establishes the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between the sets D1 and
D3. Next, note that - given n - (4) implies that M is a strictly decreasing function of m0,
which establishes the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between the sets D2 and
D3.
Next, (14) is derived. If M ! 0, m0 ! 1, mn ! 0, pb ! q, ps ! 0, 2 ! 1,
and by lHopitals rule 1 ! q1 +q . Accordingly, limM!0
C = U

q
1 +q
n
. If M ! n,
m0 ! 0, mn ! 1, pb ! 0, ps ! q, 1 ! 0, and 2 ! 1 +qq . Accordingly, C ! 0.
Finally, note that C (M) is continuous in (0; n). This and the two limit points imply that
if C < U

q
1 +q
n
, there exists a M such that C (M) = C. Denote this value by M (see
Figure 2 ). By construction,


M;n

satises C  C > ~C. This establishes the existence
of a stationary distribution m and, accordingly, the existence of a monetary equilibrium if
C < U

q
1 +q
n
.
Because C > ~C, typically a continuum of stationary distributions exist that di¤er in
their value of M . To see this, consider Figure 2, which shows C and ~C as functions of
11
Figure 2: C and eC as functions of M .
M when n = 2, U = 1,  = 0:95, and q = 1
3
. Given these values, any set of measures
hM;n = 2i satisfying C  C > ~C is stationary. For example, if C = 0:4, all elements
in the set
n
hM;n = 2i : M 2
fM; Mio satisfy C  C > ~C. There are also multiple
stationary distributions of a given amount of money, which di¤er in their levels of welfare
and in their velocities of money. To see this, consider the parameters U = 1, C = 0:6,
 = 0:95, and q = 1
3
and the following two stationary distributions of the same amount
of money: hM = 0:5; n = 1i and hM = 0:5; n = 2i. To compare welfare, dene welfare
by W =
nP
i=0
miV
i, which measures the ex ante expected utility of all agents (or a single
agent) before money is distributed among them, and note that W (hM = 0:5; n = 1i) <
W (hM = 0:5; n = 2i). The higher welfare in the second equilibrium is due to the higher
level of trade, that is, the higher level of the velocity of money.
4 Discussion
The paper relaxes the one unit storage technology imposed in the search theoretic mod-
els of at money developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993). The following results
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emerge from the model. First, if the cost of production, the degree of impatience, and the
degree of specialization are not too high, a monetary equilibrium exists. Particularly, if
the degree of impatience vanishes, for almost all parameter values a monetary equilibrium
exists. Second, the paper derives the stationary distribution of money holdings and derives
two essential features of money that cannot be derived in the basic model. It is shown
that the expected marginal value of money decreases and that in a monetary equilibrium
there is an endogenous upper bound on the money holdings: agents willingly produce and
sell for money up to this bound and refuse to do so if their money holdings exceed this
bound. Third, there are multiple stationary distributions of a given quantity of money.
The equilibria di¤er in their levels of economic activity and welfare and, consequently, a
redistribution of money a¤ects real economic variables.
While the paper investigates in detail the exchange process, it does not explore the
determination of exchange rates. One way to derive relative prices is to let the traders
bargain about the quantity of a real commodity that changes hands for one nondivisible
unit of money. This extension would result in price dispersion because the bargaining
solutions would depend on the money holdings of the bargainers. An other extension would
be to consider nonstationary distributions and the convergence property of the model. See,
for example, Green and Zhou (1998b) who consider the convergence property in a related
model when there are no constraints on money holdings and traders are assumed to have
overtaking-criterion preferences rather than discounting or Berentsen (1998) who studies
the convergence property of the model for a given upper bound on money holdings.
13
Endnotes
1The complete specialization in production and in consumption, which eliminates barter
transactions, simplies the exposition, yet is by no means necessary. The assumption that
real commodities are nonstorable, excludes the possibility that real commodities serve as
a medium of exchange. See Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) who analyze commodity money in
a related model.
2A seller who meets a buyer with several units of money could demand more than one
unit of money for his product. However, it is assumed that the agents store their money
holdings at home and visit the market with one unit of money only.
3This part is necessary because for any set of measures there is always a nonmonetary
equilibrium where no agent accepts money. This equilibrium satises i) and ii) of Denition
1. However, it does not satisfy iii) because V = 0.
4The proof is available by request.
5Details of the derivation are available by request.
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